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The Pedagogy of Guantánamo
BAHER AZMY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Representing a Guantánamo detainee is a terrible clinical case.
Representing a Guantánamo detainee is a terrific clinical case. I had
these thoughts alternatively, and often simultaneously, during the
period of time that my Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation
Clinic at Seton Hall Law School represented Murat Kurnaz, a
German-Turkish Guantánamo detainee, from July 2004 until his
release to Germany in 2006.1 At the time I took the case, the Supreme
Court had recently decided Rasul v. Bush,2 which promised detainees
a statutory right3 to file habeas corpus petitions challenging the
legality of their detentions. In the month following Rasul, the Center
for Constitutional Rights (CCR) alongside Shearman & Sterling and
Joe Margulies, who were counsel for sets of detainees that had been
before the Court in Rasul, and filed numerous ―next friend‖ habeas
* Professor of Law and Director of the Civil Rights and Constitutional
Litigation Clinic, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thank you to Joe
Margulies and Martha Rayner for their thoughtful contributions to this essay, and to
my former clinical students who worked alongside me during this remarkable
project.
1. See generally MURAT KURNAZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT
MAN IN GUANTÁNAMO (Jefferson Chase trans., 2008) (providing a compelling
description of Murat‘s ordeal in U.S. detention); Baher Azmy, Executive Detention,
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2010)
(discussing some of the significant legal proceedings related to Kurnaz‘s case). For
a discussion of evidence in his case demonstrating his innocence, see Carol D.
Leonnig, Panel Ignored Evidence on Detainee; U.S. Military Intelligence, German
Authorities Found No Ties to Terrorists, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at A1
(quoting once-classified statements in Kurnaz‘s classified file, demonstrating that
both the U.S. military and his home German government recognize he had no
connections to terrorist groups); see also Richard Bernstein, One Muslim’s Odyssey
to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at A1 (describing conclusions of
German officials that Kurnaz has no connections to terrorism or al Qaeda).
2. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2006).
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petitions on behalf of detainees whose family members had contacted
U.S. lawyers. CCR also solicited pro bono counsel to actively
represent detainees in what we assumed would be full habeas corpus
hearings in federal court. In July 2004, sixty-five detainees had filed
post-Rasul petitions in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, and they were grouped, comprehensibly, into categories
based largely upon nationality.4 At that time, major corporate law
firms in New York, Washington, D.C., and Boston represented the
majority of the detainees.
Two clinics—the International Human Rights Clinic at
American University and my Civil Rights and Constitutional
Litigation Clinic—represented one client each.5 As I was considering,
selfishly, how I could manage a case like this—with unknown
dimensions, resources, and pressure—I was moderately relieved to
see another team of experienced lawyers and, in particular, another
clinic engaged in the litigation. But the American University Clinic
styled itself as one focusing on international human rights and was
taught by experienced and talented human rights lawyers Richard
Wilson and Muneer Ahmad.6 I did not then know much about human
rights law or the laws of war, and I was worried that their presence
would highlight my own inexperience. Nevertheless, on a personal
level I was eager to join the team in this big fight. At that time, I had
not yet contemplated to any significant degree how this litigation
would function as a clinical teaching case. After having worked on
Murat‘s case intensively for two years, and on other Guantánamo and
human rights related issues thereafter, I now have a vastly improved,
if still incomplete, perspective on Guantánamo as clinical pedagogy.

4. For example, the law firm Wilmer Hale represented five Algerian residents
of Bosnia; the law firm Dorsey & Whitney represented six Bahraini nationals; and
Allen & Overy and Covington & Burling each represented multiple Yemeni
detainees.
5. First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.D.C.
2008) (No. 04-01136), 2004 WL 5378098; Supplemental Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Khadr v.
Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 04-01136), 2004 WL 5726605.
6. International Human Rights Law Clinic, AM. U. WASH. C. L.,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/inter.cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
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What follows then are some of my general reflections about
representing a Guantánamo detainee as part of a clinical project.
These are in some respects unique to my own experience and in other
respects similar to those of other clinicians who worked on
Guantánamo cases.
Soon after the initial post-Rasul habeas petitions were filed, and
lawyers ascertained identities of other detainees, numerous (and
eventually hundreds) of habeas petitions were filed on behalf of
Guantánamo detainees.7 In addition to the hundreds of lawyers from
firms of all sizes and from all regions, other clinics took on clients as
well: Joe Margulies shifted his representation from his capacity as a
private, public interest lawyer to that of a clinical law professor at the
University of Chicago and later Northwestern University;8 Martha
Rayner and James Cohen at Fordham Law School commenced
representation of multiple detainees in 2005;9 Ramzi Kessam worked
on habeas cases and military commissions cases, first as a Fellow at
Fordham, then as a Fellow at Yale Law School, and now as a full

7. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi v.
Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.D.C. 2008); Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2009);
Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2009); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.
Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.
2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009); Hammamy v.
Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.D.C. 2009); Al-Mutari v. United States, 644 F.
Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009); see also In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., No.
08-0442, 2008 WL 4858241 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (establishing case management
order to govern dozens of habeas cases to be adjudicated post-Boumediene).
8. In these capacities, Joe Margulies‘s clinic worked for one semester on the
merits briefing for the Supreme Court in Rasul, then worked on a number of
procedural issues that emerged in the early stages of post-Rasul habeas litigation,
successfully obtaining the release of his Australian client, Mamdouh Habib. His
clinic at Northwestern represented Mohammed Munaf and Shawki Omar, two U.S.
citizens detained by American forces in Iraq, from initial habeas proceedings in
district court all the way to the Supreme Court. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674
(2008). He now also represents, with me and others as co-counsel, detainee Abu
Zubaydah in habeas proceedings in D.C. district court. Cf. In re Petitioners Seeking
Habeas Corpus Relief in Relation to Prior Dets. at Guantánamo Bay, 700 F. Supp.
2d 119 (D.D.C. 2010) (litigating the habeas petitions of 105 detainees).
9. See Petitioner‘s Motion To Compel Respondents‘ Lawyer, The Dep‘t of
Justice, to Comply with this Court‘s Protective Order and End its Practice of
Barring Members of Petitioner‘s Counsel from Applying for Security Clearance at
2, Ali-Kazimi v. Bush (D.D.C. June 11, 2008) (No. 05-2386 (RBW)).
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time clinical professor at City University of New York;10 Kristine
Huskey, who had worked on her first Guantánamo habeas cases as an
associate at Shearman & Sterling, moved to American University
Washington College of Law to work with Muneer Ahmad and Rick
Wilson on Omar Kadhr‘s case and then to her own National Security
Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law, where she
represented several detainees.11 Other clinics worked on issues
related in scope, importance, and subject matter. Margaret
Satterthwaite‘s International Human Rights Clinic at NYU School of
Law worked on issues related to torture and extraordinary rendition.12
Yale Law School‘s Post 9/11 Clinic, supervised by Michael Wishnie
and Hope Metcalf, filed amicus briefs in numerous cases related to
extra-judicial detentions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and Supreme
Court and brought habeas cases on behalf of foreign nationals
detained by the United States in Bagram as well as actions for
damages against John Ashcroft and John Yoo for post 9/11 policies.13
While working on Guantánamo and related cases, I learned that
these clinics faced many of the same challenges and rewards, some of
which I will share in this essay. But the very depth, complexity, and
variation among the cases—not to mention the distinct procedural
posture in which some of the cases arose—produced obstacles and

10. Ramzi Kessam, CITY U. N.Y. SCH. L., http://www.law.cuny.edu/facultystaff/kassem.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
11. E.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d
(D.D.C. 2008); Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63. While at Georgetown and Yale
Universities, Neal Katyal challenged President Bush‘s 2001 Executive Order
unilaterally establishing military commissions for Guantánamo detainees, resulting
in the landmark ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). He worked
with numerous law students but not as part of a structured clinical course.
12. Amnesty Int‘l USA v. C.I.A., 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(torture); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010)
(extraordinary rendition).
13. See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Bivens
action by former ―enemy combatant‖ against Department of Justice attorney
alleging attorney‘s responsibility for torture and abuse); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010) (Bivens action by
individual against former Attorney General alleging unlawful detention by
pretextual use of a material witness warrant); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d
51 (D.D.C. 2009) (habeas action on behalf of individuals detained by United States
at Bagram Air Base).
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opportunities.14 This essay does not endeavor to catalogue the breadth
of clinical experiences or classify the range of successes or failures; it
merely seeks to offer some impressions about the arguably unique
pedagogical challenges these cases presented and in so doing
contribute to the emerging discussion about international clinical
education that is the subject of the Maryland Journal of International
Law Symposium, as well as to the broader development of clinical
legal education.
This reflection proceeds in three short parts. First, I explain the
ways in which representing a Guantánamo detainee is a terrible
clinical case. Second, I consider why precisely the opposite is true. I
then conclude with some observations about how these cases present
interesting twists on old clinical-pedagogical themes. Mostly, I
describe my own experiences but on occasion draw from reflections
of clinical colleagues who also worked on these issues. I also share
some recollections I solicited from former students who worked on a
variety of aspects of the Kurnaz case.15 While some independently
acknowledged the pedagogical limitations, their strongly positive
14. One critical distinction between the kinds of cases is the period of time in
which client representation occurred. Crudely divided, there were pre-Boumediene
cases (where the representation occurred prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)) and post-Boumediene cases. Prior to
Boumediene, the government took the position that Rasul only provided the district
courts with jurisdiction over habeas cases absent any substantive rights that a court
could otherwise vindicate. See Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the IntraTerritorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369 (2007) (describing the
early history of the Rasul litigation and the government‘s litigation position
following Rasul). Thus, in this period, lawyers could visit with their clients in
Guantánamo. While the parties were litigating over the substantive scope of
detainees‘ habeas corpus rights in the court of appeals and while Congress slowed
the pace of this litigation by twice attempting to effectively reverse Rasul and strip
the federal courts of statutory jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo habeas cases, there
were no full habeas hearings taking place. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741 (2005);
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). After the Supreme Court in Boumediene held that
detainees had a constitutional right to challenge their detentions (and that,
therefore, the jurisdiction stripping provisions enacted by Congress violated the
Constitution‘s Suspension Clause), 533 U.S. at 792, cases proceeded as genuine
habeas hearings that more closely resembled a traditional criminal case with
discovery, motions, and bench trials on the facts. See Azmy, supra note 1.
15. Kurnaz v. Bush, Nos. 04-1135(ESH), 05-0392(ESH), 2005 WL 839542
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005).
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recollections ultimately mirrored what we hope for from any clinical
case—a constructive learning experience. As such, their reflections
ultimately confirm the enduring power and importance of clinical
legal education.
II. WHY REPRESENTING A GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEE IS A TERRIBLE
CLINICAL CASE
There is, of course, a well-developed body of literature
explaining the broad goals of clinical legal education. These goals
include, among many others, teaching traditional lawyering skills
such as problem solving, legal research, writing and analysis,
counseling, negotiation and trial practice;16 instilling habits of
reflection and self-critique so as to encourage a continual career-long
process of learning from experience;17 and imparting broader lessons
about structural or institutional obstacles impeding access to justice
for the poor and marginalized, and the corresponding ethical
responsibilities of public interest lawyers to acknowledge and fight to
reform the justice system, for example, to engage in social justice
lawyering.18 Clinicians regularly debate whether or how to prioritize
16. See generally A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; Robert
Dinerstein, Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 508, 512–17 (1992); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical
Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28
AKRON L. REV. 463, 471–73 (1995). Anthony Amsterdam explains that clinical
legal education aspires to teach more than just concrete legal skills; it imparts
―methods of critical analysis, planning, and decision-making which are not
themselves practical skills, but rather conceptual foundations for practical skills and
for much else, just as case reading and doctrinal analysis are foundations for
practical skills and for much else,‖ all of which are ―no less conceptual or
academically rigorous than case reading and doctrinal analysis.‖ Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 612, 615–17 (1984).
17. Amsterdam, supra note 16; see also Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical
Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from
Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284
(1981).
18. See Dinerstein, supra note 16, at 515 (recognizing that one of the primary
teaching goals of most law school clinics is ―imparting the obligation for service to
indigent clients, information about how to engage in such representation and
knowledge concerning the impact of the legal system on poor people‖); see also
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among these goals19 and whether a particular clinical structure (i.e.
general docket versus specialized) or a particular case dimension (i.e.
large and complex versus narrower and discrete) are better to advance
pedagogical goals.20
As an instructor of a general civil rights and constitutional
litigation clinic, which takes on complex multi-semester federal
litigation, I often struggle with the pedagogical limitations and
challenges my chosen structure produces. I do not seek to enter these
debates here, except to note (and explain later) that in some ways
Guantánamo cases raise precisely the same pedagogical challenges
that any complex, long-term litigation does; yet, at the same time,
they can raise those challenges by a large order of magnitude.
Specifically, Guantánamo cases—particularly ones like mine that
never proceeded to a full habeas hearing—were in enormous tension
with a foundational and instrumental clinical teaching goal: student
ownership.

Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 330 (2001)
(arguing that clinical teachers have a particular obligation to teach ―that law is
something that can be, and therefore should be, used in the struggle for social
justice‖); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory
and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37,
39 (1995) (arguing that law schools, and clinical programs in particular, must
provide ―opportunities for learning about the social setting which shapes the
practice of law and issues of justice in the adoption and application of the law‖);
Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality,” 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6 n.10 (1997)
If all I can do in law school is to teach students skills ungrounded in a
sense of justice then at best there is no meaning to my work, and at worst,
I am contributing to the distress in the world. I am sending more people
into the community armed with legal training but without a sense of
responsibility for others or for the delivery of justice in our society.
19. See Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175 (1996)
(recognizing that, in constructing a clinic, teachers may choose to prioritize certain
goals over others based on their own values, expertise, and resources).
20. See, e.g., Nancy M. Maurer, Handling Big Cases in Law School Clinics, or
Lessons from My Clinic Sabbatical, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 879 (2003); Daniel S.
Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New Innocence
Project, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1097 (2003); Frank Askin, A Law School Where Students
Don’t Just Learn the Law; They Help Make the Law, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 855
(1999).
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The primary way to achieve many of the aforementioned
pedagogical goals of clinical instruction is to get students to take
serious ownership over their cases. Clinicians, by and large, want
students to meet, communicate, and ultimately empathize with clients
who depend on the judgment and work of a student-lawyer; they also
want students to take the lead, or at least meaningfully contribute to
strategic decisions that will have a real impact on this person‘s life,
and in so doing, credit that individual‘s values or preferences in a
collaborative, client-centered decision-making process. This basic
aspiration has a reciprocal and reinforcing relationship to core legal
skills that clinics seek to impart, including factual investigation,
developing case theories and narratives, and careful, competent, and
thoughtful written and oral advocacy. If students care deeply about
their case and client, then they can own any mistakes they may make
on the client‘s behalf; through learning the real consequences of their
mistakes, they will develop habits of the reflective, self-conscious,
ethical lawyer mentioned above—in theory, anyway.
I learned quickly in working on Murat‘s case, however, that
student ownership over the case, at least through conventional means,
would initially appear to be an insurmountable task. Consider some
obvious limitations. First, students could not meet the client; Murat
was imprisoned two thousand miles away in a fully armed and
guarded military base. Visiting was not only expensive and time
consuming (it required flying to Fort Lauderdale and connecting to a
three hour charter flight to the military base), but it was also
forbidden to anyone who did not obtain a Secret-level security
clearance.21 As a result, students missed out on what is arguably the
foundational lawyering experience: they could not interview or
directly counsel the individual with whom they had an attorney-client
relationship.22 The students could not hear Murat‘s voice, shake his
21. In the first few years of the Guantánamo litigation, the Justice Department
took the position that students could not apply for a security clearance in order to
visit with clients. My understanding is that they have since changed that position,
though it would still require students to go through the time consuming process of
applying for, and being approved for, such a clearance—a task that would be
difficult to complete in under three months.
22. One student, who overall described her work on the case as a personally and
professionally transformative experience, nevertheless observed that ―the most
challenging/regrettable part of the experience was not being able to meet the client
and speak with him. It was disappointing to put all this hard work and effort into
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hand, listen to his story, reassure, or counsel him. They were thus
denied an interactive relationship that would facilitate
comprehending his circumstances and seeing the problem through his
eyes—that is, to experience empathy.23 This is no small omission,
considering the profoundly ―othering‖ and dehumanizing process
these clients had undergone in American media and politics. By the
time we took the case, the Bush Administration had denounced all
Guantánamo detainees as ―enemy combatants,‖ and senior
administration officials had characterized them as the ―worst of the
worst‖ or ―among the most dangerous, best trained, vicious killers on
the face of the earth.‖24
I could certainly describe to my students my impressions of our
client based on my visits and conversations with him, and attempt to
articulate the apparent injustice of his brutal incarceration. But only
by actually sitting across from Murat for hours—hearing about his
ordeal, his family, his faith, absorbing his obvious warmth, delighting
the case and then not be able to share that with the client directly.‖ E-mail from
Victoria Cioppetini, former clinic student, to author (Jan. 16, 2011) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Cioppetini].
23. Implicit in Steve Ellmann‘s description of the importance of developing
habits of empathy is an expectation that a lawyer will meet face-to-face with a
client. He explains:
Empathic lawyering aspires to a vision of lawyers capable of overcoming
their own limitations of perspective so as to see or feel the world as other
persons do, despite the differences of race, gender, class, culture or simply
identity that divide us from each other. The experiences and perspectives
of the powerful, however, are not the same as those of the powerless. To
cross the gap—and to be perceived by one‘s client as having crossed it—
the lawyer generally needs more than just intellectual curiosity. She needs
some sympathetic identification with those from whom her experience
may otherwise separate her.
Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1003 (1992).
24. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Detainees Are Not
P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6
(discussing how Vice President Cheney referred to the detainees as ―the worst of a
very bad lot‖ and claimed ―[t]hey are very dangerous. They are devoted to killing
millions of Americans‖); see Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Some at Guantánamo
Mark 5 Years in Limbo; Big Questions About Low-Profile Inmates, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 2007, at A1; see also Tim Golden & Don Van Natta, Jr., The Reach of
War; U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2004, at A1 (noting that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers claimed
most of the detainees ―would gnaw hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it
down‖).
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in his sense of humor, shaking his hand to say hello, and embracing
him to say goodbye—could one genuinely empathize with this client
and commit, like so many Guantánamo habeas lawyers did, the
enormous time, resources, and emotion necessary to represent the
client.25 Likewise, students could not experience all the sensory and
emotional weight these detentions imposed on the client: the
experience of being on an island prison in Guantánamo, with the
surrounding apparatus of military might: chains, shackles, guns, and
torture and interrogation rooms.26 Young and sometimes sheltered,
students benefit immeasurably from seeing clients in the clients‘ own
challenging environments; it is an experiential learning process that
causes students to reflect upon and assimilate such ―disorienting
moments.‖27 Fighting for back wages for an indigent client or bail for
your incarcerated client takes on a special urgency that mere
invocation of the Fair Labor Standards Act or the Fifth Amendment
never can when students actually see the home of an indigent client
or the harsh conditions of a client‘s detention. This is especially true
of a place like Guantánamo. Most Guantánamo lawyers have crystal
clear—and deeply unsettling—memories of their first visits to that
25. It was primarily because of my interpersonal experiences that we did form a
core of our advocacy strategy—while court proceedings were stayed pending
resolution of a myriad of appeals, we recognized that the best chance for Murat‘s
release was to convince a reluctant German government to negotiate for his return.
To do this, we tried to persuade the German public to demand action from their
government. Through many dozens of media appearances, meetings with German
NGOs and human rights organizations, I told stories about Murat and the injustices
of Guantánamo, to humanize the former and villainize the latter. Whether this
strategy contributed in some way to his ultimate release we cannot know, but the
point is it derived quite naturally from the singular experience, denied to students,
of meeting and empathizing with our client.
26. Joe Margulies emphasizes that this represents a critical distinction between a
Guantánamo case and just another complex litigation. Professor Margulies also
works on death penalty cases and believes that the opportunity for students to meet
with their client, housed as he is on death row in Terre Haute, Indiana, is a crucial
part of their clinical experience—and one notably absent from his clinical work on
Guantánamo cases. Telephone Interview with Joseph Margulies, Clinical Professor
of Law and Assistant Dir., MacArthur Justice Ctr., Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law
(Jan. 14, 2011).
27. See Quigley, supra note 18, at 52 (summarizing this learning process as one
which involves at least three stages—the ―disorienting experience,‖ the
―exploration and reflection,‖ and the ―reorientation‖—and that, ―upon
reorientation, the learner‘s perspective is transformed in such a way that the
previously disorienting experience is explained‖).
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horrible place, and those memories no doubt sustained so many in
their vigorous efforts to challenge the lawlessness in Guantánamo.28
A second, and related, limitation on students‘ ability to assume
ownership over this Guantánamo case was their lack of access to full
information. In response to each habeas petition, the Government did
file an unclassified summary of the asserted factual basis for a
petitioner‘s detention; yet much, and in some cases most, of the
evidence against a detainee was kept classified.29 As such, only
security-cleared counsel could view it, and even then it could only be
viewed at a ―secure facility‖ outside of Washington, D.C.30 Similarly,
under rules counsel accepted as a condition to visiting clients,
everything a Guantánamo detainee said to counsel was deemed
presumptively classified and thus could not be discussed with
nonsecurity-cleared counsel.31 Notes of client meetings were sent
28. See THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW
(Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE GUANTÁNAMO
LAWYERS] (collecting stories of Guantánamo habeas lawyers).
29. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451–52 (D.D.C.
2005), vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.
2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), vacated sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 282
F. App‘x 844 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 282 F. App‘x 844 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Because every complete [factual return] contained classified information,
respondents filed redacted, unclassified versions on the public record,
submitted the full, classified versions for the Court‘s in camera review,
and served on counsel for the petitioners with appropriate security
clearances versions containing most of the classified information disclosed
in the Court‘s copies but redacting some classified information that
respondents alleged would not exculpate the detainees from their ―enemy
combatant‖ status.
30. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2004)
(requiring habeas counsel to obtain security clearances to view classified material
and ordering government to establish ―one appropriately approved secure area‖).
This security protocol has since been replaced with the Protective Order and
Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba. In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig. Cases, No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008
WL 4858241 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008).
31. See In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 187 (―Counsel is
required to treat all information learned from a detainee, including any oral and
written communications with a detainee, as classified information, unless and until
the information is submitted to the privilege team and determined to be otherwise
by the privilege team or by this Court or another court.‖); id. at 190 (―Counsel may
not otherwise divulge classified information related to a detainee‘s case to anyone
except those with the requisite security clearance and need to know using a secure
means of communication.‖).
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under seal from Guantánamo to the secure facility and were reviewed
by a team of (neutral) Justice Department employees, who might
thereafter deem some or all of the attorney-client notes unclassified.32
As such, students without security clearance had no access (or at
least no immediate access) to much of their clients‘ version of events;
they also could not see the bulk of the Government‘s evidence
against the client. The limitations this posed on a student‘s ability to
engage in core clinical practices like factual investigation and
developing a theory of the case are self-evident.33 Professor Martha
Rayner describes the difficulties this limitation—unique, in her
experience, to Guantánamo cases—posed:
In my clinic work I strive to place the student as fully in the
shoes of a lawyer as possible. In a classic criminal defense
clinic, this is very doable. This wasn‘t possible in Gtmo
work. For example, only a very few students obtained
clearance and traveled to Gtmo to meet with clients; most
students never met their clients. And having some students
cleared and others not created tensions at times—certain
students couldn‘t have access to full information.34
Professor Rayner describes practices she adopted to mitigate these
problems, such as committing herself ―to taking copious notes during
client meetings, so the later declassification process would allow
students access to their clients‘ information.‖35 Because
declassification could take weeks, this process (particularly in the
context of an academic schedule) became especially frustrating for
her, even though it represented only ―one of many, many
obstacles/inconvenience[s] that the representation brought on,‖
32. See id. at 184 (describing the privilege team as ―comprised of one or more
DoD attorneys and one or more intelligence or law enforcement personnel who
have not taken part in, and, in the future, will not take part in, any domestic or
foreign court, military commission or combatant status tribunal proceedings
involving the detainee‖); id. at 188–89 (describing process for submission of
attorney notes and classification procedures).
33. See Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role
of Innocence Projects in Clinical Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 240–
41 (2006) (describing the importance of fact development in otherwise large scale
innocence project clinics).
34. E-mail from Martha Rayner, Clinical Assoc. Professor of Law, Fordham
Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Jan. 5, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Rayner].
35. Id.
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distinguishing Guantánamo from other big litigation matters she
sometimes undertakes.36
By no means did this prevent students from working with the
limited public facts made available by the Government, or from
investigating facts on their own. Some embraced and appreciated the
challenge, precisely because the process of learning the facts in
Guantánamo cases was distinct from other legal clinics.37 Often there
was enough information in the public record to allow students to
develop a compelling narrative;38 student-lawyers also could develop
persuasive narratives independent of the full factual record, for
example, by criticizing procedural irregularities associated with the
Government‘s limited tribunal process, the prevalence of torture and
36. Id. Others have observed the challenges that complex litigation poses to
clinical methodology. See Medwed, supra note 20, at 1140 (concluding that the
size and complexity of innocence project cases make it difficult to take ownership
of cases and that such cases ―are often intricate, protracted and politically sensitive,
suggesting that faculty intervention, either actual or potential, to some extent may
be an omnipresent cloud over student autonomy‖). I agree with Professor Rayner
that the Guantánamo cases added layers of complexity and uncertainty that
substantially exacerbated the already serious challenges associated with complex
federal or international litigation.
37. According to a former student,
One of the things I loved most about the case, however, was the high
profile nature of it and the complex legal issues involved. I really enjoyed
crafting new legal arguments (as opposed to re-using old arguments in a
new context) and really thinking through the different theories.
Participating in that level of the legal analysis was so rewarding. It was a
very academic way of approaching litigation work, which I greatly
enjoyed.
Cioppetini, supra note 22.
38. One notable example of this comes from Joe Margulies‘s clinic at
Northwestern. His clinic represents Abu Zubaydah, a detainee who had been in
secret CIA custody for years prior to his transfer to Guantánamo, in Mr.
Zubaydah‘s post-Boumediene habeas proceedings. Because Mr. Zubaydah was
such a high profile detainee—among other things, he was the very target of the
Bush Administration ―Torture Memos‖—an enormous amount had been written
about him in the public record. Thus, even though Mr. Zubaydah‘s habeas file was
classified at the highest level of secrecy, students had a great deal with which to
work. Among the strategic goals the clinic pursued was changing the public
perception of Mr. Zubaydah as a high level al Qaeda operative—a goal they largely
achieved. See, e.g., Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled
No Plots: Waterboarding, Rough Interrogation of Abu Zubaida Produced False
Leads, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2009, at A1.
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abuse, and the importance of elementary due process and the rule of
law.
A third significant limitation on the students‘ ability to take
ownership of the case was that they were largely unable to appear in
court. More specifically, their ability to engage in direct oral or
written advocacy in a court of law was restricted in a number of
ways. First, early on in the litigation, the original thirteen sets of
habeas petitions filed immediately after the Rasul decision were
consolidated in order to resolve legal questions common to all
petitions.39 That left thirteen sets of counsel to draft and file one set
of briefs on some of the major threshold questions presented in the
cases and led to a process that decidedly did not accommodate
students‘ schedules, capacity, or authority. After more cases were
filed, distinct legal and factual issues did emerge among the petitions
which permitted independent, client-specific filings.40 Still, the legal
issues in these cases were immensely complex—unprecedented and
dazzlingly confusing even to experienced lawyers. Among the
myriad questions counsel grappled with were the following: Does the
Due Process Clause extend extraterritorially? What were the common
law procedural and substantive guarantees of habeas corpus
preserved by the adoption of the Suspension Clause in 1789? What
treaty and human rights obligations bound the United States, and
were they enforceable in U.S. courts? What is ―international
humanitarian law,‖ and how can it be applied to captures and
detentions of this kind? What is the substantive scope of the
Executive‘s detention power during a time of conflict, measured
against domestic and international law? What are the statutory or
regulatory limits on the Executive‘s authority to classify certain
documents?41
39. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (D.D.C. 2005).
Two of the thirteen sets were then disaggregated from the original consolidation by
the judge who had been originally assigned those petitions. See Khalid v. Bush, 355
F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
40. For example, my students worked thoroughly on researching, drafting, and
filing briefs in support of a motion filed before the district court. This motion was
for a preliminary injunction requiring the Defense Department to give advance
notice to counsel and the court prior to transferring a detainee out of Guantánamo
and thus out of the jurisdiction of the court.
41. See, e.g., Petitioners‘ Brief on the Merits at 9–10, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004) (No. 03-334), 2004 WL 162758 (arguing that the Due Process Clause
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These were enormously challenging conceptual and intellectual
questions when they were presented in the litigation leading up to and
following Boumediene.42 But there was a more cosmic challenge:
presented with an actual case of a real person in Guantánamo, we had
to ask, what do we actually do? For this, there was simply no
precedent. And, as hard as a landlord-tenant case or misdemeanor
criminal case can be, at least there is law to which students may look
for guidance.43
Professor Anthony Amsterdam teaches that a distinctive form of
reasoning taught in the clinical setting involves ―ends-means
thinking.‖44 This is a form of strategic thinking that reasons
backwards: it begins with a set of objectives, sketches out all of the
routes to them, and determines the first steps to take only after
considering where they may lead, as well as the relative advantages
and disadvantages attending them.45 As a part of this process,
Professor Amsterdam explains, a student engages in ―hypothesis
extends extraterritorially); id. at 11–16 (describing the common law history of the
habeas statute); id. at 21–23 (describing arguments made regarding the Suspension
Clause); id. at 24–29 (arguing that treaty and human rights obligations bind the
U.S.); see generally id. (attacking the scope of the Executive‘s detention power
during a time of conflict); Opening Brief for the Guantánamo Detainees at 14–25,
Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-5117–05-5127),
2008 WL 4449292, at *30 (arguing for limits on the Executive‘s ability to classify
certain documents).
42. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed on behalf of Guantánamo
detainees); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that U.S.
citizens must receive a meaningful opportunity to challenge basis for detention
under the Due Process Clause); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006)
(finding that Geneva Conventions apply to detainees); Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 794–95 (2008) (holding that detainees have a constitutional right to
habeas); Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 544–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(discussing the Executive‘s ability to classify documents forming the factual basis
for detentions).
43. As Professor Rayner explains, ―Gtmo is also different because the source of
law was so diverse and in most instances extremely unformed. Even though
complex litigation can involve cutting edge legal issues (as can simple litigation for
that matter), the ‗law of Gtmo‘ had to be constructed almost from scratch.
Traditional sources of guidance for students, e.g. texts, treatises, law review
articles, [and] case law had yet to be written.‖ Rayner, supra note 34.
44. Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 614.
45. Id. (describing ―ends-means thinking‖ as ―the process by which one starts
with a factual situation presenting a problem or an opportunity and figures out the
ways in which the problem might be solved or the opportunity might be realized‖).
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formulation and testing in information acquisition,‖ and ―decisionmaking in situations where options involve differing and often
uncertain degrees of risks and promises of different sorts.‖46 But if
we began with the goal of ―getting our client a hearing‖ or ―getting
our client out of Guantánamo,‖ brainstorming with students about
steps to undertake toward that goal, and hypothesizing advantages or
disadvantages of that approach, was exceedingly challenging absent
any templates.
Professor Rayner highlights this as one of the great challenges of
the pre-Boumediene casework:
While clinic students often operate under great uncertainty
and this is in fact one of the challenges of clinic work, I, as
the experienced practitioner, operate under far less
uncertainty. But this wasn‘t true as to the work on behalf of
our clients at Gtmo. We all operated under great
uncertainty. As in any representation, the need for decision
making was vast, but the information base, templates,
structures and experience to make good judgments were
sorely lacking or non-existent. For example, in the spring of
2007, a trip to Yemen was being organized by Tina Foster,
then at CCR. Should we travel to Yemen to meet with our
clients‘ families, [and] conduct investigations? Was this a
good use of resources? What could we accomplish there?
Was there any value in doing press work in Yemen? Were
press efforts best applied domestically or internationally?
What is our message?47
Professor Rayner explains that basic litigation decisions were
―equally difficult.‖48 For example, ―should we file a [Detainee
Treatment Act] case?49 Should we file a complaint with the Inter46. Id.
47. Rayner, supra note 34.
48. Id.
49. Under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148,
div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741 (2005) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (2006)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008),
Congress purported to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo
habeas petitions, but provided an alternative—and exceedingly limited—means to
review ―enemy combatant‖ designations by the military. DTA § 1005(a)–(e), §
2241 (setting out review procedures); id. § 1005(e), § 2241(e)(1) (stripping
jurisdiction). While we awaited decisions in the court of appeals and Supreme
Court on the legality of the DTA, litigants had to balance imponderable
considerations: Might the infinitesimal possibility of relief under the DTA be worth
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American Commission on behalf of one client‘s daughter (students
spent many hours drafting this petition, which we ultimately did not
file)?‖50 Professor Rayner observes that ―[t]his was a far cry from
deciding whether to move to suppress physical evidence seized from
a client‘s person—wherein the pros and cons could be ascertained
and measured quite accurately.‖51
As Professor Rayner and other clinical professors acknowledge,
the foregoing limitations have been mediated somewhat by the
Supreme Court‘s 2008 decision in Boumediene.52 As a result of that
decision, rendered four years after Rasul, detainees have a clear
entitlement to pursue their habeas hearings in federal district court in
D.C.53 Though the law is still far from settled, a template for
litigating these cases has been developing, including a governing case
management order, provisions for discovery, burdens of proof, and
substantive standards of law.54 Dozens of cases have gone through a
full-merits hearing, and detainees have prevailed in those hearings in
a large majority of cases.55 Professor Rayner distinguishes the preBoumediene challenges previously described from these proceedings
pursuing? If detainees do pursue such claims, does it weaken the broader strategic
goal of demonstrating to the federal courts that the DTA remedy is an inadequate
and undesirable substitute for habeas corpus—and thus does not save the DTA‘s
jurisdiction-stripping provisions from constitutional infirmity? The latter is the
position ultimately vindicated at the Supreme Court in Boumediene, so all‘s well
that ends well; but, in the meanwhile, these were magnificently complicated
strategic quandaries.
50. Rayner, supra note 34.
51. Id. In addition, unlike most clinical cases, where the client, subject matter,
and tribunal are in reasonable proximity to the law school, these cases were global
in scope. All cases were consolidated in Washington, D.C., requiring travel for
hearings from any law school not located in the nation‘s capital. The ―secure
facility‖ housing classified information was also located in D.C. The clients of
course, were in Guantánamo, thousands of miles and thousands of dollars away—a
considerable obstacle even for those students who were eventually able to get
security clearance. Factual investigation, developing critical relationships with
family members, and the important work of advocacy in the client‘s home country,
all had to happen abroad. For my client‘s case, this required frequent trips to
Germany—not insurmountable, but still too expensive for our Clinic to take
students. For others, this required travel to the Middle East.
52. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
53. Id. at 794–95.
54. I have called this development ―The New Common Law of Habeas.‖ See
Azmy, supra note 1, at 450.
55. See id. at 499.
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because ―now the work is somewhat more traditional and straightforward. For our clients the avenues of relief have narrowed
considerably and each path is essentially litigation[,] albeit in an
unusual context.‖56 Kristine Huskey at the University of Texas
School of Law and Ramzi Kessam at the City University of New
York School of Law continue to represent detainees as a part of this
process.57 Joe Margulies also recognizes that the post-Boumediene
process, albeit still challenging, looks more like traditional
litigation.58 As part of this process, he has been able to work
successfully with students on many levels. Margulies and his students
came to strategic conclusions about how to approach Mr. Zubaydah‘s
case, recognizing that discovery of certain crucial information was in
their client‘s best strategic interests.59 Thereafter, his students were
active in studying a growing corpus of published opinions by judges,
hearing habeas cases on substantive and procedural questions, and
participating in drafting memorandums of law related to the scope of
discovery, spoliation of evidence, and the Governments‘ substantive
detention authority.60 What was initially very strange is gradually
becoming familiar.

56. Rayner, supra note 34.
57. See Kristine A Huskey, U. TEX. AUSTIN SCH. L., http://www.utexas.edu/law/
faculty/profile.php?id=huskeyka# (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (noting that Professor
Huskey is the Acting Director of the National Security Clinic, which represents
Guantánamo detainees); National Security Clinic, U. TEX. AUSTIN SCH. L.,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/nationalsecurity/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011)
(describing the work of the Clinic, including work on behalf of Guantánamo
detainees); Ramzi Kassem, supra note 10 (noting that Professor Kassem directs the
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Clinic (IRRC), which represents Guantánamo
detainees); Immigrant and Refugee Rights, CITY U. N.Y. SCH. L.,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/clinics/clinicalofferings/ImmigrantandRefugee/nationalsecurity.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (noting that the IRRC represents
individuals detained under policies ―arising out of government policies in the
aftermath of September 11‖).
58. Telephone Interview with Joseph Margulies, supra note 26.
59. Id.
60. Id. Indeed, as part of Professor Margulies‘s clinic, students analyzed all
district court and court of appeals decisions governing the Guantánamo cases and
created a database (or a rough digest along the lines of a case reporter) analyzing
the numerous propositions of law emerging from those cases. See Roderick
MacArthur Justice Center, NW. L. BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, http://www.law.north
western.edu/macarthur/guantanamo/caselisting/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
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III. WHY REPRESENTING A GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEE IS A TERRIFIC
CLINICAL CASE
Clinicians recognize that, beyond teaching ―lawyering skills,‖
they seek to subtly impart broader lessons about our system of
justice—its limitations, structural and implicit biases, and frequent
reluctance to accommodate poor or marginalized persons.61 One can
learn this in a traditional doctrinal class, of course, assuming a
professor or casebook raises those issues. But where the client‘s
rubber meets the law‘s road—where the collateral consequences from
a client‘s prior criminal conviction, or the predatory lending behavior
of lenders against the poor, or the skepticism some juries will have
toward some minority groups in some places—clinics provide an
incomparable context in which to communicate such lessons.
In a way, Guantánamo raised the greatest meta-lesson of all for a
law student: what does the term ―Rule of Law‖ actually mean? In the
traditional law school curriculum, the phrase lurks in the background;
it is a banal concept undergirding uniform procedural rules, property
rules, structural and rights-based constitutional law, and the like. The
proposition has its roots in Constitutional Law, particularly in the
landmark case Marbury v. Madison.62 Chief Justice Marshall leaves
us with some foundational principles: ―[T]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the
first duties of government is to afford that protection‖ and ―the
[G]overnment of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws and not of men.‖63 These are important
principles, to be sure, signifying that a government official‘s high
status does not exempt her from the obligation to answer for the
wrongs she committed.64 But especially because these principles
appear at this level of high abstraction, and are considered so
61. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
63. Id. at 163.
64. Justice Robert Jackson‘s elegant exposition of this principle in the Steel
Seizure case also makes it into the first year constitutional law canon. ―These
[principles] signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.‖
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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foundational to our self-identity, they are taken as a given. In the law
school setting, this country‘s commitment to the Rule of Law is not
controversial and is rarely tested.
But Guantánamo forced us—especially clinical students—to
consider what happens in the absence of the Rule of Law, and not just
in foreign nations like Haiti, Mali, or Myanmar, but on U.S. soil. In
Guantánamo, President George W. Bush claimed unreviewable
authority in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy to detain indefinitely any person, apprehended anywhere in the
world, under criteria established in secret and outside the traditional
constraints of U.S. or international law designed to limit Executive
authority.65 In the absence of transparent or neutral rules, President
Bush exercised complete discretion—sometimes arbitrary, often
incoherent—to detain, release, or bargain over human beings in his
custody.66 In the absence of collateral review of decisions, the
President employed discretion and unilateral will.67 In the absence of
law, the President and military were free to employ fear, intimidation,
and ultimately, violence.68 It was a lesson not lost on many educated
observers.
Clinical students working on the detainee cases got to see in
small, incremental—and in their view, ultimately outrageous—ways

65. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 36, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) (No. 03-334) (arguing that courts do not have authority to review Executive
determinations as ―[t]he President, in his capacity as Commander in Chief, has
conclusively determined that Guantánamo detainees . . . are not entitled to prisonerof-war status under the Geneva Conventions‖); Alan W. Clarke, De-cloaking
Torture: Boumediene and the Military Commissions Act, 11 SAN DIEGO INT‘L L.J.
59, 110 (2009) (describing how the President has ―unilateral and unreviewable
power to establish interrogation methods‖); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure:
Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661,
691 (2009) (describing how the government argued, but courts later rejected,
arguments that the Executive had unlimited, unreviewable discretion to determine
who to detain because the Judiciary was obligated to take facts pled by the
government as true).
66. See Eugene Robinson, Viewpoints: Rumsfeld Will Tell You What to Think
About the War; Silly Me. Americans Just Aren’t Smart Enough to Think About Such
Things, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 5, 2006; Rosa Brooks, That’s the GOP’s Big Gun?,
L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2006; Clarke, supra note 65.
67. See Clarke, supra note 65.
68. Id.; see generally JOE MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006).
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how discretion, will, and violence coalesced into monstrous
injustice.69
The clinic students saw leaked government documents and
witness statements evidencing brutal, dehumanizing, and desperate
interrogation techniques. Such techniques, students learned, were not
merely an aspect of arbitrary human cruelty. They were part of a
systematic program, approved at high levels of government, designed
to exert full control over this group of persons and reduce them to
base ―animal-like instincts‖—a totalitarianism writ small.70 By
producing a state of ―learned helplessness,‖ detainees would lose all
hope of resistance or release and become entirely dependent upon
their interrogators.71 At the same time, clinic students saw the
profound value that law, and lawyers, could provide. If, as astute
observers have explained, Guantánamo‘s sine qua non was the denial
of hope (in order to force detainees to succumb to interrogation),72
then law and lawyers provided an important antidote. Instead of
talking exclusively to interrogators who demanded answers in order
to implicate and further detain them, detainees could now hear
69. For compelling accounts of the myriad absurdities, injustices, and excesses
in Guantánamo, see CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O‘CLOCK FERRY TO THE
WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2007); STEVEN T.
WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA: FIGHTING FOR JUSTICE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
(2008); MAHVISH RUKHSANA KHAN, MY GUANTÁNAMO DIARY: THE DETAINEES
AND THE STORIES THEY TOLD ME (2008); KRISTINE HUSKEY, JUSTICE AT
GUANTÁNAMO: ONE WOMAN‘S ODYSSEY AND HER CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE (2009);
MARGULIES, supra note 68.
70. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005).
71. Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, In Adopting Harsh Tactics, No Inquiry Into
Past Use, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 21 2009, at A1 (describing how learned ―helplessness
would make someone more dependent, less defiant and more compliant,‖ and how
that idea formed a key principle in the government‘s interrogation techniques);
Scott Horton, Six Questions for Jane Mayer, Author of The Dark Side, HARPER‘S
MAG., July 2008, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/07/hbc90003234 (describing how ―learned helplessness‖ would ―erode a prisoner‘s
resistance to being interrogated and foster total dependency upon an interrogator‖).
72. See MARGULIES, supra note 68, at 29–35 (describing Army Field Manual
and KUBARK interrogation methods and noting that virtually every aspect of the
Administration‘s detention policy, and everything it has done at Guantánamo, has
been shaped by this uncompromising vision of intelligence gathering); see also id.
at 36–39 (describing how these techniques were used on Guantánamo detainees in
the ―ideal interrogation chamber‖ designed to ―open the greatest window of
psychological vulnerability‖).
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counsel say, ―I‘m on your side, I promise. Tell me your story, let me
tell others, let me help you.‖ The students I worked with were deeply
moved by this exposition of the lawyer‘s role.
Students saw numerous procedural obstacles imposed by the
U.S. Department of Defense in order to limit our client‘s access to
justice and to undermine efforts of habeas counsel.73 They learned
that when detainees at Guantánamo were not meeting with their
habeas counsel, military interrogators would tell them the law could
not help them (―You are in a place where there is no law; we are the
law,‖ was a frequent interrogator‘s refrain)74 or to make their point
more sinister and pathetic, taunt detainees with ―evidence‖ that their
habeas counsel were Jews—suggesting Jewish lawyers, as opposed to
their Gentile interrogators, were the true enemy.75 Students saw the
Government attempting to limit the number of security clearances to
habeas counsel, and thus the number of their opposing counsel on a
matter before a court of law, in a self-serving manner that would give
government lawyers an obvious litigation advantage.76 Students
73. See, e.g., Gaillard T. Hunt, Bibles Prohibited, in THE GUANTÁNAMO
LAWYERS, supra note 28, at 118, 118–19 (describing how military officials refused
to allow a lawyer to send a bible to a client through a chaplain); Clive Stafford
Smith, Underwear, in THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS, supra note 28, at 126, 126–30
(recounting how the government accused a lawyer of attempting to smuggle in nonprison issue undergarments); David H. Remes, Calculated Inefficiencies, in THE
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS, supra note 28, at 137, 137 (describing the ―logistical
restrictions on lawyers‘ access to clients at Guantánamo‖); Chuck Patterson,
Bureaucratic Bullshit, in THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS, supra note 28, at 141, 141
(describing ―the perfect storm of bureaucratic bullshit‖ between ―the DOJ, DOD,
the CIA, and the armed services, overseen by a micromanaging White House‖).
74. David Cole, There is No Law, NATION, Mar. 6, 2007, available at
http://www.thenation.com/print/article/there-no-law.
75. Neil A. Lewis, Reporter’s Notebook: At Guantánamo, Refueling with Java
and Windmills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at A1 (quoting comment made to
Thomas Wilner‘s Guantánamo client by interrogator, ―How could you trust a
Jewish lawyer? Don't you know that Jews have betrayed Muslims throughout the
years?‖).
76. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 73, at 141–42 (describing how a top-secret
cleared former Marine could not obtain the requisite clearance necessary to visit
Guantánamo for more than two years); Amal Bouhabib, Loyalty, in THE
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS, supra note 28, at 142, 143–44 (describing the difficulties
a dual-citizen law student had in obtaining a security clearance); Yasmin
Zainulbhai, Zoom Out for a Broader Look: An Unclassified Tale, in THE
GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS, supra note 28, at 145, 145 (noting that the government at
one time barred law students from applying for security clearance).
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reviewed a menacing letter from Department of Justice counsel
suggesting that by making public information the Government itself
deemed ―unclassified‖ (albeit accidentally), I had exhibited a ―failure
to act circumspectly‖ in this area of national security, and threatened
serious consequences.77 This produced considerable anxiety at first,
but after a while, we realized that we had done nothing wrong—these
bullying tactics seemed increasingly desperate, and the force of law
seemed increasingly to be on our side.
One episode that students particularly enjoyed involved the
Government‘s refusal to permit me to send a German-English
dictionary to my client to help him understand attorney-client
correspondence and pleadings in his case. According to Government
counsel, this 4x4 inch dictionary was a security risk because it could
potentially be used as a deadly weapon and could permit detainees to
translate—and perhaps decode—conversations by interrogators. As
my students asked rhetorically, with some consternation, ―[W]ere
interrogators spilling top secret information in front of detainees?‖
―Didn‘t DOJ counsel know that Murat was already fluent in
spoken—if not written—English and thus could have been already
well into the process of cracking the Guantánamo code?‖ Students
perceived this, at best, as petty bureaucratic nonsense, and at worst, a
reflection of broader, sinister attempts to frustrate our client‘s access
to counsel and the legal process.
Student saw pointless over-classification of documents including
portions of an important written opinion by a federal district judge.78
77. Letter from Terry Henry, Senior Trial Counsel, Dep‘t of Justice, to author
(Mar. 5, 2005) (on file with author).
78. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451–52 (D.D.C.
2005), vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.
2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), vacated sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 282
F. App‘x. 844 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 282 F. App‘x. 844 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Among the statements in the opinion the government fought to keep classified, but
which it was eventually forced to disclose, were descriptions that exonerated
Murat, including: ―CITF [Criminal Investigative Task Force] is not aware of
evidence that Kurnaz was or is a member of al-Qaeda. CITF is not aware of any
evidence that Kurnaz may have aided or abetted, or conspired to commit acts of
terrorism.‖ The Germans confirmed that this detainee had no connections to an alQaeda cell in Germany. Even worse, the government attempted to keep classified
the Judge‘s simple observation that there was exculpatory evidence in Murat‘s file
that the government ignored. See Carol D. Leonnig, Evidence Of Innocence
Rejected at Guantánamo, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at A1 (discussing that there
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Some of these documents were later made public through Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) litigation which revealed that redactions
insisted upon by the Government did nothing more than completely
exonerate our client and, accordingly, embarrass the Government.79
The students learned that in the absence of law and judicial process,
secrecy and control often reign.
On substantive grounds as well, the students saw the legal
position of the Government finally laid bare. Students learned that the
key declassified charge against our client was that a friend of his had
―carried out a suicide bombing‖ in Germany two years into Murat‘s
detention in Guantánamo.80 Putting aside the remarkable proposition
of ―law‖ that one could be detained indefinitely based on the
unknown acts of another person thousands of miles away, it was
factually absurd; for as students assisted in discovering, the suicide
bomber was actually alive and well in Germany and under no such
suspicion of wrong-doing. Students were at first confused, then
outraged that the system could tolerate such injustice. As one student
recently remarked, one aspect of her experience that was
[E]ye-opening was watching (and experiencing) the
[G]overnment‘s attempt at substantiating its claims. For me,
it was very strange and disconcerting to see the weakness of
the [G]overnment and its poor attempts at trying to cover its
mistakes. I remember always thinking if the [G]overnment
is going to such great lengths to maintain Kurnaz‘s ―guilt‖

was ―conflicting exculpatory evidence in at least three separate documents‖). These
statements, and a trove of other exculpatory documents, were later revealed
following the filing of a Freedom of Information Act request and complaint—and
extensive briefing —on which Clinic students and summer research assistants
worked. See id.; see also 60 Minutes: Nightmare at Guantánamo Bay (CBS News
television broadcast Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.
com/video/watch/?id=3980799n (describing recently declassified exculpatory
documents in Murat Kurnaz‘s case).
79. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant‘s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6–7, Azmy v. Dep‘t of Def., 562 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(No. 06 Civ. 15340 (JSR)) (noting that the government produced documents in
response to a FOIA request); DEP‘T OF DEF., OARDEC/SER: 0215, REVIEW OF
COMBAT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #061 (2004), available at
http://law.shu.edu/publications/ResearchCenters/upload/kurnaz_prod_part_one.pdf
(presenting the unredacted versions of CSRT returns; redacted version on file with
author).
80. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1.
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(even though it was so obvious he was innocent) what else
are they trying to keep undercover?81
And for some students, they saw themselves participating in a
fundamental enterprise. As another student recalls:
For me, and I suspect my fellow clinical students, the clinic
took place in sort of surreal, heightened-reality. It seemed to
be the ultimate test case of whether we live in a world where
the rule of law rei[g]ns supreme, or whether law was in fact
a pretext which those in power could disregard or bend at
their own convenience.82
Students also attended the first post-Rasul oral argument in the
district court.83 In that hearing, the students heard the Government
assert that the President had authority to detain a ―little old lady from
Switzerland‖ who had mistakenly sent money to the Taliban under
the misimpression it was an Afghan orphanage.84 The students, like
nearly everyone else in the courtroom, audibly gasped. These were
among the thousands of absurd propositions that populated the
jurisprudence of Guantánamo and which generated a healthy concern
about—and skepticism over—the breadth of the Government‘s
claims.85 At some point, students supplemented their outrage with
laughter at the absurdity; I remember thinking around that time, if we
81. Cioppetini, supra note 22.
82. E-mail from Arthur Owens, former clinic student, to author (Feb. 6, 2010)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Owens].
83. Neil A. Lewis, Fate of Guantánamo Detainees is Debated in Federal Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A36 (reporting on Dec. 1, 2004 hearing before D.C.
District Judge Green).
84. Id. (reporting the exchange between Judge Green and senior Department of
Justice attorneys).
85. As one student perceptively recalls in considering another broad government
legal position:
The other thing that struck me about the Kurnaz case was the sheer
breadth of the government‘s ―mosaic theory.‖ While many of the
government‘s arguments challenged my preconceptions about Gitmo, this
theory confirmed my skepticism. The idea that any piece of information,
no matter how innocuous, should be protected from disclosure because it
might be combined with some other information in some damaging way
shocked me. In short, I found it difficult to accept that the American
government felt the right to hide any and all information about itself from
its own citizens—which is what this argument amounted to.
E-mail from Jared LeFevre, former clinic student, to author (Jan. 23, 2011) (on file
with author).
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can laugh, we can win. Law and reason were ascendant over rage and
despondency, and the students did have a keen eye for some of the
deeper absurdities and hypocrisy of Guantánamo.
IV. SOME INTERESTING GUANTÁNAMO TWISTS ON TRADITIONAL
CLINICAL PROBLEMS
In addition to the very basic tension identified above—between
the limits on the students‘ experiences and the richness of that limited
experience—work on Guantánamo cases presented some interesting
twists on age-old clinical teaching problems. To take just a few:
A. Student Skepticism Toward a Client
Clinical teachers are well aware of the problem of the skeptical
student. ―Should we be representing this criminal defendant when we
know he‘s guilty or, even worse, when he beat up his defenseless
girlfriend?‖ ―I‘m worried that our foreclosure client knew full well
she couldn‘t afford this loan; should we reward her opportunism?‖ ―I
don‘t believe our asylum client‘s story about his persecution abroad;
it seems like everything he‘s been saying has been inconsistent, and I
don‘t want to spoil my reputation before the bar.‖ If clinical teachers
have appropriate time and patience, these will present genuine
teaching opportunities, as part of the clinical learning process is to
work through these assumptions.
Interestingly, I encountered no similar reluctance in representing
a Guantánamo detainee. One obvious reason was that students selfselected my clinic with a predisposition in favor of the cause. But
there may be other explanations worth considering. Perhaps because
no process was in place where we were outside the traditional
narratives and tropes of the adversary process, students did not face
the same reluctance or inner conflict. We were in fact arguing for the
possibility of creating those narrative tensions down the line; at one
level, we were arguing for this case to be treated like any other case.
If the client was, indeed, a terrorist or war criminal, would we not at
least need a legitimate forum—habeas or a criminal trial—to
demonstrate it, and then, for those so inclined, mete out the harshest
punishment possible? At a seemingly irrefutable level of abstraction,
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the client was a principle of law, not just a human being.86 Since
Boumediene and the development of a genuine, adversarial habeas
process, perhaps clinical programs actually involved in the defense of
a client face some of the ―what-if-he-is-guilty?‖ trepidation; but even
now, because of consistent infirmities and broader challenges to
ensure the process is robust in practice, it appears that this is still not
the case.
Even among students whose personal politics generally aligned
with the then-existing Administration, this experience taught them
that law is different from politics, and lawyers have a duty to
represent individuals accused of acts they find personally
distasteful.87
B. The Role of Lawyers and the Legal System: An Inversion of
the Narrative of Power
As mentioned earlier, clinical instructors often use real cases to
highlight the broader systemic deficiencies, biases, and limitations of
our justice system—whether in the criminal, civil, or immigration
context.88 The justice system cannot be ―fixed,‖ but we do what we
can at the margins, and that too, is important. But in the Guantánamo

86. Which is not to say there were not important reasons for students to
aggressively take the side of our client, whose personal and legal story students
found deeply compelling. Some of those reasons included the extraordinary nonlegal aspects of his detention: no one, the argument would go, should be tortured;
no one should be denied any contact with family; no one should be gratuitously
humiliated, sexually or religiously. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 702 & cmts. j., l., m. (1987).
87. As one student explained:
I remember struggling a bit with the idea of working on the case because it
seemed to be at odds with my personal politics and my beliefs at that time
that the war on terror should be drastic and intense. I also remember
coming to a realization very early on—being reassured by your comfort in
doing this work—that it was a valuable experience to a developing lawyer
to work on protecting the rights of someone or something and putting
aside personal doubts. The clinic experience helped me understand that
every accused person or unpopular/maligned defendant is entitled to
zealous representation within the bounds of ethics.
E-mail from Patrick Gilmartin, former clinic student, to author (Jan. 25, 2011) (on
file with author).
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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context, the ―system‖ actually acted as a long, lost hero.89 Our
fighting principle was that our ―system‖ of justice—and habeas
corpus—works; in fact, it has worked since King John proclaimed the
Magna Carta law at Runnymede,90 since Chief Justice John Marshall
eulogized the writ of habeas corpus,91 and since the Supreme Court
chastised President Lincoln for applying military tribunals to
citizens.92 It was not that the principles to manage the Guantánamo
crisis did not exist, but rather they had seemingly been abandoned.
At the same time, students felt part of something short-of a
movement. I say ―short-of a movement‖ because social movements—
at least the iconic kinds—typically convince society that fundamental
change of the status quo is required.93 Iconic movement activists or
lawyers are almost always outsiders pushing for social change. 94 By
contrast, the detainee lawyers were, by and large, institutionally
conservative—from large corporate law firms, major universities, and
89. Certainly, at a higher level of abstraction, one could argue that, in light of
historical incidents like Japanese internment, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and
Supreme Court doctrine there are even deeper systemic forces—embedded in
American constitutional tradition or national character—pushing us to an institution
like Guantánamo. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In re Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
90. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218–19
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (―Executive imprisonment has been considered
oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should
be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers
or by the law of the land. The judges of England developed the writ of habeas
corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint.‖).
91. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–101 (1807).
92. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 34 (1866) (―[M]ilitary tribunals
for civilians, or non-military persons, whether in war or peace, are inconsistent with
the liberty of the citizen, and can have no place in constitutional government.‖).
93. See, e.g., David A. Super, In Egypt, Treading the Path of Civil Rights, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 14, 2011, at 11A.
94. Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2054 (2010) (―New Deal lawyers were mostly outsiders, a
‗coalition of minorities—social ethnic, regional, and intellectual,‘ who flocked to
Washington D.C. ‗with their hair ablaze‘ seeking social change for the people . . .
.‖) (footnotes omitted); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements and the
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1445 (2005)
(―[E]lite-dominated interest group litigation and progressive social movements
aimed at accomplishing fundamental change are distinct and largely incompatible
phenomena.‖); Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and the
American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 747 (1984) (―. . . New Deal lawyers
did share one trait—they were usually outsiders.‖).
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the like.95 They were not seeking a radical transformation of the
status quo; they were, at least in their minds, seeking a return to the
status quo.96 The American Bar Association,97 English
Parliamentarians,98 retired generals99 and judges,100 and a lion of the
civil rights establishment, Fred Korematsu,101 were all on our side.
One student recalls fondly seeing the profession operating in
accordance with its highest ideals:
Any practicing attorney would appreciate, there are
moments of comp[l]ete anger and frustration where a
rational person would begin to question why they would

95. See, e.g., Stacy Sullivan, The Minutes of the Guantánamo Bay Bar
Association, N.Y. MAG., June 26, 2006, at 44, available at http://nymag.com/
news/features/17337/ (describing the experiences of lawyers from blue-chip law
firms like Dorsey & Whitney, Covington & Burling, and Allen & Overy); Carlyn
Kolker, Justice at Bay: Ten Months After a Supreme Court Ruling Almost Nothing
Has Changed, AM. LAW., May 2005 (describing the coalition of lawyers as ―a
distinguished assembly‖ of ―big-firm partners and associates, law professors, [and]
solo practitioners . . . ‖).
96. See Kolker, supra note 95 (―Lawyers . . . have devoted thousands of hours to
tussling over basic rights: the right to counsel, the right to see a doctor or read a
magazine.‖).
97. See, e.g., Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696),
2004 WL 354187.
98. See Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-343, 03-334), 2004 WL
96766.
99. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Military Officers in Support of
Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL
99346; see also Brief for the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03343), 2004 WL 96758; Brief of Former American Prisoners of War as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334,
03-343), 2003 WL 22490571.
100. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL
73259; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Former U.S. Government Officials in
Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343),
2004 WL 96757 (brief of former high-level government officials in support of
detainees); Brief of Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL
96760 (brief on behalf of retired diplomats in support of detainees).
101. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 103832.
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choose to continue with such a profession. However
fleeting, when I am faced with such a circumstance, I try to
recall the experiences and practitioners that uphold the
values of the profession, and without a doubt, the Gitmo
Clinic is one such experience that comes to mind. That is
probably all a law student could ask for from a clinic
experience.102
C. Creative Social Justice Lawyering
For the entire period of our representation—between Rasul in
2004 and Boumediene in 2006—habeas petitions were not proceeding
to hearings on the merits.103 Following Rasul, and after some early
promise of meaningful habeas review, Congress twice attempted to
strip federal court jurisdiction over Guantánamo habeas cases (once
in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,104 which was deemed nonretroactive and thus inapplicable by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,105 and
again in the Military Commissions Act of 2006,106 deemed
unconstitutional in Boumediene v. Bush).107 While we were litigating
these abstract legal questions in a coordinated way in the D.C. Circuit
and Supreme Court, the initial promise of Rasul faded. Thus, lest we
seem worthless to our clients, we had to do something. Students were
pressed to be creative.
With habeas proceedings at a standstill, we concluded that to get
Murat home, we would need to try to convince his home Government
of Germany to negotiate for his return. This presented interesting
opportunities for advocacy in atypical forums. Students drafted press
packets for domestic and German media. They produced
comprehensive briefing books for diplomats, highlighting Murat‘s
credible claims of innocence, the brutal conditions of his confinement
102. Owens, supra note 82.
103. See Azmy, supra note 1, at 456, 499 (noting that Rasul ―did not decide the
merits of any habeas petition‖ and that Boumediene ―set in motion a process . . . by
which the detainees can challenge the sufficiency of their detentions‖).
104. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005)
(codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)–(2)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008).
105. 548 U.S. 557, 575–76 (2006).
106. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)–(2)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
107. 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
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and interrogation, and the need for diplomatic intervention.108 Each
set of materials required thinking seriously about storytelling for
different audiences. Students also made important contributions to
our factual investigation, to the extent it was possible at this
preliminary stage. For example, the Government claimed that our
client‘s association with a religious missionary group in Pakistan,
Tablighi Jama‘at, rendered him an enemy combatant.109 We knew
nothing of this group, so students did extensive research on religion
and politics in Pakistan and drafted a document convincingly
demonstrating that this group is avowedly peaceful and rejects
politics and violence associated with other extremist organizations in
Pakistan.110 Along with several expert affidavits, we submitted these
findings in a brief111 submitted on our client‘s behalf as part of an
(ultimately toothless)
administrative review process
in
112
Guantánamo, and I understand that this work has been relied upon
108. The Unlawful Detention of Murat Kurnaz, Briefing Book to German Consul
in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2005) (on file with author).
109. DEP‘T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL: KARNAZ [SIC], MURAT (Sept. 22, 2004), at 76, available at http://www.
dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/000001-000100.pdf; see also The Guantánamo
Docket, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, available at http://projects.nytimes.
com/guantanamo.
110. Submission of Detainee Murat Kurnaz to the Administrative Review Board
for the Office of Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants
11–17 (Feb. 1, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kurnaz Submission].
111. See Letter from Qamar-ul Huda, Professor of Islamic Studies &
Comparative Religion, to author (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/
pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_Set_5_200000-20254.pdf (regarding
Tablighi Jama‘at‘s peaceful activities); Letter from Barbara D. Metcalf, Dir., Ctr.
for S. Asian Studies, Univ. of Mich. Ann Arbor, to author, available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript _Set_ 5_20000020254.pdf; Letter from Jamal J. Elias, Professor of Religion, Amherst Coll., to
author (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/ foi/detainees/csrt
_arb/ARB_Transcript_Set_5_200000-20254.pdf; see also Kurnaz Submission,
supra note 110.
112. In addition to Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the Department of
Defense initiated what it called Administrative Review Board (ARB) hearings,
which it analogized to a parole hearing. Unlike in the CSRTs, ARB hearings
permitted submissions on the detainees‘ behalf by their counsel. The hearings were
designed to ascertain whether there are factors suggesting a detainee is no longer a
threat to the United States or whether there are other factors in favor of continued
detention. See Memorandum from Department of Defense Designated Civilian
Official Gordon England, Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for
Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Sept. 14,
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by subsequent detainees also charged by the military with
connections to this religious group.113 Students worked on motions
that could be briefed largely without reference to classified materials,
such as a motion to prohibit the military from transferring our client
out of the court‘s jurisdiction without advance notice.114
Students also pursued collateral litigation to help with the
substance of the case such as FOIA litigation to obtain medical
records and to declassify evidence of Murat‘s innocence.115 Other
clinics in this time period also developed strategies to meaningfully
involve students. For example, American University‘s International
Human Rights Clinic, directed by Richard Wilson, developed
international law arguments challenging the treatment and detention
of Omar Khadr, a juvenile, which they asserted in both domestic and
international law forums.116

2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2004/d20040914admin
review.pdf [hereinafter DOD Memo]. In connection with this process, students
were involved in preparing arguments about why our client‘s association with
Tablighi Jama‘at is not probative of any dangerousness and in preparing statements
from experts and family members in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the
military to release him.
113. See DOD Memo, supra note 112, at enclosure (3)1 (describing the ARB
process as an ―annual review to determine the need to continue to detain enemy
combatants,‖ during the War on Terror using ―all reasonably available and relevant
information,‖ and empowering the Board to ―make . . . recommendation[s]‖ for
release, transfer, or continued detention). A recent article summarizes the ARB
process:
The ARBs consisted of three military officers who reviewed ―reasonably
available and relevant information‖ regarding a detainee to determine
whether he should be released, transferred to another nation for
imprisonment or conditional release, or remain at Guantánamo. The ARBs
provided even fewer procedural protections than the CSRTs: the detainee
and his nonlawyer ―Assisting Military Officer‖ were permitted only to see
the nonclassified information relied upon by the Board, and the detainee
was not allowed to call any witnesses.
See Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 621 (2010).
114. Kurnaz v. Bush, No. 04-1135, 2005 WL 839542, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 12,
2005) (ordering Department of Defense to give advance notice to Petitioner‘s
counsel before transferring Petitioner out of Guantánamo to a third country).
115. See, e.g., Azmy v. Dep‘t of Def., 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (adjudicating validity of exemptions claimed in response to FOIA request
seeking documents about Murat Kurnaz‘s detention and interrogation).
116. Richard J. Wilson, A Long, Strange Trip: Guantánamo and the Scarcity of
International Law 3 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Working Paper, Jan. 1, 2009),

AZMY

2011]

9/25/2011 1:41 PM

THE PEDAGOGY OF GUANTÁNAMO

79

Thus, in addition to applying traditional legal skills—
storytelling, factual investigation, and written advocacy—this period
of representation, when the courts were largely closed off, exposed
students to a variety of non-litigation forms of social justice
advocacy. It also highlighted the importance of strategic
collaboration with a range of other institutions, lawyers, and activists
in pursuit of law reform.
V. CONCLUSION
My ambivalence about Guantánamo as a clinical teaching tool
remains, though I do take heart in the positive recollections my
former students recently shared with me. In addition to exposure to
traditional pedagogical goals of clinics, students appear to have been
shocked, inspired, and angered; their eyes were opened wide, and
they left each semester with a feeling that, despite high and unjust
obstacles, we did all we could for our client and our cause. Perhaps
there is nothing else we can ask.
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